Varieties of recollective experience. by Kihlstrom, John F
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Varieties of recollective experience.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4rg7r04t
Author
Kihlstrom, John F
Publication Date
2020-02-01
DOI
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107295
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Neuropsychologia 137 (2020) 107295
Available online 4 December 20190028-3932/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Varieties of recollective experience 
John F. Kihlstrom *,1 
University of California, Berkeley, USA   
A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Keywords: 
Medial-temporal lobe memory system 
Amnesic syndrome 
Familiarity 
Recognition 
Recollection 
Remember/know paradigm 
A B S T R A C T   
Four variants on Tulving’s “Remember/Know” paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective 
experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing 
(similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognition- 
by-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Ex-
periments 1–3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1–3), 
and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by “feeling”, but 
rarely by “knowing”; d’ is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1–4). Recognition-by-knowing in-
creases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, 
recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional 
Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without- 
remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural 
substrates of memory retrieval.   
1. Varieties of recollective experience 
Although we have learned a great deal about memory over the years, 
it often seems that whenever we discover yet another previously 
unknown fact about memory, we have succeeded in adding more to 
what there is to know than to what we do know (Tulving, 1995, p. 
839). 
One of the landmarks of the “consciousness revolution” in psychol-
ogy was the emergence of research on the phenomenal experience of 
remembering the past. These studies began with Tulving (1985b), who 
distinguished between two qualitatively different recollective experi-
ences: remembering, or one’s concrete awareness of oneself in the past 
(“autonoetic consciousness”, p.1), and knowing, one’s abstract knowl-
edge of the past (“noetic consciousness”, p.1). Since that time, what has 
come to be known as the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm has become 
very popular in cognitive psychology (Migo et al., 2012; Reder et al., 
2000; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010) – and more recently in the 
psychology of emotion (Gorlin et al., 2018). 
The R/K paradigm was further developed by Gardiner (Gardiner, 
1988, Exp. 1), who asked subjects to study a list of words under pho-
nemic or semantic orienting tasks, and then to complete a yes/no 
recognition test. Whenever the subjects endorsed an item as old, they 
were asked to indicate the nature of their recollective experience. If 
recognition of a particular item was accompanied by conscious recol-
lection of its occurrence on the study list, they were to rate the item as 
“remembered”; if not, they were to rate it as “known”. About 25% of 
recognized targets were assigned to the Know category, meaning that 
they were correctly recognized in the absence of recollective experience. 
More to the point, the experiment yielded a dissociation between level of 
processing and recollective experience: Remember judgments were 
affected by the level of processing at the time of encoding, but Know 
judgments were not. 
Although Gardiner’s development of the R–K paradigm was inspired 
by Tulving, 1985 paper, his conception and Tulving’s seem to be 
somewhat different. For Tulving, the R–K distinction maps onto his 
earlier distinction between episodic and semantic memory (Tulving, 
1972). Remembering reflects the person’s awareness that an event “is a 
veridical part of his own past existence” (1985b, p. 3), while knowing 
reflects the person’s “symbolic knowledge of the world” (1985b, p. 3). 
But for Gardiner, the R–K distinction maps more closely onto Mandler’s 
(1980) distinction between retrieval and familiarity. 
Recognition-by-retrieval, now commonly known as “recollection”, in-
volves remembering an event as an event, including the personal and 
* Department of Psychology, MC 1650, University of California, Berkeley, 2121 Berkeley Way Berkeley, California, 94720-1650, USA. 
E-mail address: jfkihlstrom@berkeley.edu.   
1 https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~jfkihlstrom/ 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Neuropsychologia 
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologia 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107295 
Received 4 May 2019; Received in revised form 26 November 2019; Accepted 3 December 2019   
Neuropsychologia 137 (2020) 107295
2
spatiotemporal context in which the event occurred, and the role of the 
self as the agent or patient, stimulus or experiencer of the event (Brown 
and Fish, 1983; Fillmore, 1971; Kihlstrom, 1997, 2009; Kihlstrom et al., 
2002 ; Kihlstrom and Klein, 1994; Rissman and Majid, 2019). By 
contrast, recognition-by-familiarity involves an intuitive feeling that 
some event occurred in the past, in the absence of conscious recollection 
of that event (Kihlstrom et al., 1996). For Gardiner and others (e.g., 
Wixted, 2009; Wixted and Mickes, 2010), Remember judgments reflect 
recognition-by-retrieval, while Know judgments reflect 
recognition-by-familiarity. 
Similarly, Yonelinas (2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010) has mapped 
recollection (remembering) and knowing (interpreted as familiarity) 
onto Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation framework for analyzing 
memory and other aspects of performance: recollection reflects 
controlled processing, while familiarity is a product of automatic pro-
cessing. Recognition-by-recollection is conceived as an all-or-none 
“threshold” process: either subjects remember studying the target item 
or they don’t. Recognition-by-familiarity is conceived as a continuous 
“signal-detection” process, depending on the strength of studied items. 
An alternative framework is provided by Schacter’s (1987) distinc-
tion between explicit and implicit memory – another landmark in the 
consciousness revolution (Kihlstrom, 1987, 2012). Explicit memory in-
volves the conscious recollection of an experience from the past, as in 
recall or recognition, while implicit memory refers to any memory-based 
change in experience, thought, or action that occurs independent of, and 
in the classic case in the absence of, conscious recollection. Priming and 
saving in relearning are good examples of the latter. From this point of 
view, remembering reflects explicit memory, while knowing, inter-
preted as familiarity, reflects something closer to implicit memory. 
These alternative interpretations of remembering and knowing are 
connected, from Mandler’s point of view, because both priming and 
recognition by familiarity are based on the activation by an event of 
previously stored knowledge, while recollection involves a further 
process of elaboration. Schacter does not endorse this activation view of 
implicit memory (Schacter and Badgaiyan, 2001), but that is another 
matter. 
These divergent perspectives on remembering and knowing suggest 
that it may be misleading to conflate knowing with intuiting, and se-
mantic memory with implicit memory. In fact, there may be at least 
three varieties of recollective experience – or, as it were, three different 
memory qualia. Remembering involves the conscious recollection of some 
past event, as an explicit expression of episodic memory. Knowing refers 
to abstract knowledge of that event, much like an item in semantic 
memory. Feeling is the intuition that an event occurred in the past, as an 
implicit expression of episodic memory. 
These different memory qualia are familiar to anyone who has ever 
taken a multiple-choice test. Sometimes, we choose a response because 
we remember the circumstances under which we learned it – the 
particular lecture, or, as sometimes happens, the location on the text-
book page where the information appeared (Johnson and Raye, 1981; 
Rothkopf, 1971). On other occasions, we choose a response because we 
just know the answer – it is part of our generalized, abstract knowledge 
about the world, and we do not (and need not) remember the circum-
stances under which we learned the answer – an experience analogous to 
source amnesia (Evans, 1979; Evans and Thorne, 1966; Schacter et al., 
1984). On still other occasions, we choose a response because we intuit 
that it is the correct one. We do not actually know the answer, and we 
certainly do not remember where we learned it, but we choose a 
response because it strikes us as familiar, and we infer from this feeling 
of familiarity that, of all the choices available, this is the one that is most 
likely to be correct (Jacoby, 1991). We are guessing, in a way that we are 
not guessing when we are remembering or knowing (Gardiner and Java, 
1990), but it is not random guessing of the sort that signal-detection 
theory takes into account. Rather, our guesses are informed by the 
feeling of familiarity. 
The interpretation of “knowing” as retrieval from semantic memory 
receives some support from neuropsychological research. In the case of 
patient K.C., for example, who became densely amnesic following a 
closed head injury was unable to remember even a single event from his 
entire life (Tulving, 1989; Tulving et al., 1988). Nevertheless, he 
retained considerable “impersonal” autobiographical knowledge – for 
example, that he spent weekends and summers at a family cottage. 
Similarly, patient D.B. suffered a severe retrograde and anterograde 
amnesia following anoxic encephalopathy secondary to a heart attack 
(Klein et al., 2002a, 2002b,; ,). Nevertheless, he was able to answer 
questions about the recent past that did not involve his own personal 
experiences. 
A wide variety of studies support a distinction between episodic and 
semantic autobiographical memory – what Klein et al. (2002a, p. 357) 
called the “lived past” and the “known past”. For example, normal aging 
reduces the amount of episodic detail associated with remote autobio-
graphical memory, but has no comparable effect on semantic detail 
(Devitt et al., 2017; Levine et al., 2002). For example, aging subjects 
may not remember a specific incident from first grade, but still 
remember the name of their first-grade teacher (e.g., Piolino et al., 
2002). Similar differences have been observed in children (Kalenzaga 
et al., 2015; Willoughby et al., 2012); patients with amnestic mild 
cognitive impairment (e.g., Murphy et al., 2008), Korskoff syndrome 
(Rensen et al., 2017), and depression (S€oderlund et al., 2014); probands 
at risk for Alzheimer’s disease (Grilli et al., 2018); and healthy in-
dividuals with severely deficient autobiographical memory (Palombo 
et al., 2015). 
The apparent dissociation between the “lived past” and the “known 
past” seems similar to Tulving’s original distinction between remem-
bering, construed as retrieval from episodic memory, and knowing, 
construed as retrieval from semantic memory (see also Klein and 
Steindam, 2016). Knowing the personal past somewhat resembles source 
amnesia, in that people have knowledge of events occurring in their 
personal lives, without conscious recollection of the experience by 
which they acquired that knowledge. Malvina Dean, who died in 2009, 
was the last living survivor of the Titanic disaster, and this fact was an 
important part of her identity; but given that she was only two months 
old at the time, she had no conscious recollection of the event. 
Similarly, intuitive feelings about the personal past resemble the 
feeling of knowing (Hart, 1965), which can occur in episodic as well as 
semantic memory (Schacter, 1983). The role of such intuitions in 
episodic memory is illustrated by a study of retrograde amnesia induced 
by electroconvulsive therapy (ECT; Dorfman et al., 1995). In this 
experiment, depressed patients studied a wordlist immediately prior to 
receiving ECT. Afterwards, they showed a dense amnesia when tested 
with stem-cued recall, but normal levels of stem priming. On half the 
items of a subsequent recognition test, the patients were instructed to 
adopt a strict criterion for recognition, saying “yes” only if they were 
“fairly sure” that they had studied the item previously; for the remaining 
half, they were instructed to adopt a looser criterion, responding “yes” if 
they only “thought” that they might have seen the word, or if it seemed 
familiar to them “at all”. Compared to controls, the patients showed a 
profound recognition deficit under the strict criterion; but their perfor-
mance improved significantly under the loose criterion, with no increase 
in false positives, resulting in a significant increase in d’. The patients 
were not merely guessing under the looser criterion, but rather were 
strategically using the feeling of familiarity that accompanies priming to 
improve their recognition performance (for similar observations in 
sensory signal-detection, see Tataryn and Kihlstrom, 2017). 
These intuitive feelings of familiarity lie at the core of most in-
terpretations of the R/K distinction (Migo et al., 2012; Williams and 
Lindsay, 2019). For example, Yonelinas (2001, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 
2010) has marshalled considerable evidence for a dual-process signal--
detection (DPSD) model of recognition memory in which recollection 
(an alternate label for remembering) is conceived as a “threshold” pro-
cess in which subjects recall specific information about an event, and 
familiarity is a “signal-detection” process based only on memory 
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strength. The model successfully accounts for findings from a variety of 
R/K experiments as well as experiments involving confidence ratings 
and Jacoby’s process-dissociation procedure. Familiarity appears to 
enable amnesic patients to perform reasonably well on recognition tests 
of episodic memory (e.g., Hirst et al., 1986), suggesting that the hip-
pocampus plays a critical role in recollection, but not in familiarity; 
similarly, it may be that the perirhinal cortex is critical for familiarity, 
but not for recollection (Bowles et al., 2007). 
Still, the feeling of knowing is not the same as knowing, and both are 
different from remembering a past event in its full spatiotemporal and 
personal context. Employing a tripartite distinction among remem-
bering, “just knowing”, and familiarity similar to the one at issue in the 
present research, Conway and his colleagues documented an “R-to-K 
shift” in the acquisition of semantic knowledge concerning psychologi-
cal facts (Conway et al., 1997) or the meaning of obscure words (Dew-
hurst et al., 2009). On an initial test, the subjects’ dominant response 
was “remembering” the circumstances under which a fact was learned; 
on a later test, the dominant response shifted to “just knowing” that a 
statement was true. 
This paper reports a series of extensions of Gardiner’s (1988, Exp. 1) 
reference experiment, attempting to distinguish among remembering, 
knowing, and feeling in episodic memory. The research addressed three 
major questions: (1) Can the recollective experiences of knowing and 
feeling could be dissociated from each other, and from remembering, in 
that they respond differently to various experimental manipulations? (2) 
Do the response latencies for recognition differ among the different 
recollective experiences? (3) Do remembering, knowing, and feeling 
differ in accuracy? 
2. Experiment 1 
The first experiment was a conceptual replication of Gardiner’s 
(1988) Experiment 1, examining the effect of depth of processing on 
recollective experience, with instructions to the subjects altered to 
clearly distinguish between “knowing” and “feeling”, as alternatives to 
“remembering”. The results of this experiment are presented in full. The 
analysis of later experiments has been abbreviated in the interests of 
space (and readability). 
3. Method 
Subjects. A total of 26 Yale University undergraduates, all native 
speakers of English, volunteered to participate in an experiment on 
“Language and Memory”, in return for cash payment for each of two 
sessions lasting less than 1 h each. In this and all of the other experi-
ments reported in this paper, sample size was determined by the his-
torical conventions of experimental cognitive psychology (as described 
by Rouder and Haff, 2018), with an average of 33 subjects in each study, 
employing powerful within-subject designs. All experiments were 
approved by the appropriate Institutional Review Board, and all subjects 
gave informed consent prior to their paid participation. 
Materials. All of the experiments reported in this paper employed a 
set of 160 nouns of medium to high frequency (20–50/million according 
to Kucera and Francis, 1967) developed by Rajaram (1993). Another list 
of 24 words, nonoverlapping with the stimulus set, was randomly drawn 
from a newspaper to serve as a practice trial for the recognition test. 
Procedure. The same basic procedure was followed in most of the 
experiments reported in this paper. The subjects studied a list of 80 
words under conditions of a levels of processing manipulation: for 40 
items in the phonemic condition, they generated rhymes; for 40 items in 
the semantic condition they generated free associates. For each item on 
the study list, subjects were presented with a fixation point for 400 msec, 
followed by a prompt indicating the subject’s task (phonemic or se-
mantic) for 1.0 s, and finally the target word for 2.5 s; after a blank 
interval of 500 msec, the next cycle was begun. After a 24-h retention 
interval, the subjects returned to the laboratory to perform a yes/no 
recognition test, distinguishing between 80 targets and 80 lures. Test 
items remained on the screen until the subject responded. Both the study 
and test phases of the experiment were controlled by computer software, 
which also recorded subjects’ response latencies during the recognition 
test. 
For each item recognized, the subjects also reported their accom-
panying recollective experience in terms of remembering, knowing, or 
feeling, using the following instructions, adapted from Gardiner (1988) 
and Rajaram (1993). 
On a computer screen you will see a number of words presented one 
at a time. For each word, please indicate, by pressing the appropriate 
key, whether or not you recognize that word from the study list which 
was presented earlier. If you do not recognize the word, press “N”. If you 
do recognize the word, indicate the basis for your judgment of famil-
iarity – that is, whether you actually remember the word from the study 
list or whether there is some other basis for your recognition judgment. 
Remember judgments. If your recognition of the word is accompanied 
by a conscious recollection of its prior occurrence in the study list, then 
press the key marked “R“(for “Remember”). “Remember” means that 
you are consciously aware again of some aspect or aspects of what 
happened or what was experienced at the time the word was presented – 
for example, aspects of the physical appearance of the word on the 
computer screen, or of something that happened in the room, such as the 
buzzing of a fly in the background, or of what you were thinking and 
doing at the time. In other words, a “remembered” word should bring 
back to mind a particular association, image, or something more per-
sonal from the time of study, or something about its appearance or po-
sition – for example, what came before or after that word. 
If you cannot consciously recollect anything about the actual 
occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at the time of its 
occurrence, you should not respond with an “R“(for “Remember”), but 
should make one of two other possible responses. 
Know judgments. In this case you might simply know, for example, 
that the word was on the list, in the same way that you know your own 
name, or birthday, or that Bill Clinton is President of the United States 
[Note: These experiments were conducted in the mid-to-late 1990s]. You 
don’t remember anything about the experience of acquiring this 
knowledge, you just know that it’s true. In the same way, you might 
know that a word was presented for study, even though you don’t 
remember anything about what you experienced at the time that the 
word was presented. If this is the case, you should press the key marked 
“K“(for “Know”). 
Feel judgments. Alternatively, you might have a feeling or intuition 
that the word was on the list without actually remembering its 
appearance as such. This experience is the kind of experience that occurs 
when you’re at a party, and you see someone across the room who 
strikes you as familiar. You don’t know who the person is, and you don’t 
actually remember ever having met him or her before, but your feeling is 
such that if you had to guess, you’d guess that you had met that person 
before, or that you’d recognize his or her name. If this is the case, you 
should press they key marked “F“(for “Feel”). 
To give you a better idea of the three distinctions that we have 
mentioned, consider how you might respond on a multiple-choice test in 
school. Sometimes, you just know the answer; other times, you actually 
remember having learned the material, such as where it appears on a 
page in your textbook; sometimes an answer just rings a bell, so you feel 
that it must be the right choice. 
4. Results 
The main data analyses paralleled those of Tulving, 1985 and 
Gardiner (1988), focusing on recognition hits and ignoring false alarms 
(Table 1). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed the expected 
levels of processing (LoP) effect on overall recognition (combining R, K, 
and F reports): the subjects recognized 75% of the items from the pho-
nemic condition, and 82% of the items from the semantic condition (F 
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(1, 25) ¼ 5.54, MSE ¼ 0.06, p ¼ .027, ηp2 ¼ 0.18). 
Dichotomous Classification of Recollective Experience: 
Remembered vs. “Not-Remembered” Items. In the traditional R/K 
paradigm, as applied by Tulving, Gardiner, and others, “Know” is a re-
sidual (default or wastebasket) category: if a subject recognizes an item 
and also consciously remembers its occurrence, the item is classified as 
“remembered”; otherwise it is classified as “known” (for a survey of 
variants on the traditional R/K paradigm and their effects on perfor-
mance, see Williams and Lindsay, 2019). In this usage, recog-
nition-by-knowing might better be termed recognition-without-remem 
bering. Because “Knowing” receives a more restrictive definition in these 
experiments, the Know and Feel categories were first combined to yield 
a residual category of “Not Remembered” (NR) items, which would have 
received “Know” ratings according to the criterion established by 
Tulving and Gardiner, in contrast with the Remember category. 
Following Gardiner (1988, Note 1), recollective experience was treated 
as an independent variable. 
A 2 � 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with two independent variables 
(level of processing: phonemic or semantic; recollective experience: R or 
NR) duplicated the significant main effect of level of processing noted 
earlier; in addition, there was a significant main effect of recollective 
experience: fewer recognized items were associated with R than with NR 
reports (F (1, 25) ¼ 8.94, MSE ¼ 0.51, p ¼ .006, ηp2 ¼ 0.26). Most 
important, there was an interaction between level of processing and 
recollective experience similar to that observed by Gardiner (1988) and 
many others (F (1, 25) ¼ 6.78, MSE ¼ 0.13, p ¼ .015, ηp2 ¼ 0.21). 
Compared to phonemic processing, semantic processing increased R 
ratings (t (25) ¼ 3.84, p ¼ .001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.75), but had no effect on 
NR ratings (t (25) ¼ 1.10, ns. 
Of course, as Rajaram (1993) has noted, this interaction is not quite 
legitimate: because R and NR exhaust the components of recognition, 
the two ratings are not stochastically independent, and any variable 
which affects one component must affect the other component in the 
opposite direction. One solution, proposed by Rajaram, is to calculate 
the ratio of R reports to all recognition hits. This also yielded a signifi-
cant levels of processing effect (F (1, 25) ¼ 11.24, MSE ¼ 0.12, p ¼ .003, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.31). 
Trichotomous Classification of Recollective Experience: Dis-
tinguishing among Remembering, Knowing, and Feeling. When 
overall recognition was decomposed into all three experiential compo-
nents, fewer than half of recognized items were rated as R, with the 
remaining NR items split evenly between K and F. As was the case with R 
reports, there were more K reports associated with semantic than with 
phonemic processing; but the effect reversed with F reports. A 2 � 3 
repeated-measures ANOVA with two independent variables (level of 
processing, phonemic or semantic; recollective experience, R, K, or F) 
yielded the significant main effect of level of processing noted earlier, as 
well as a significant main effect of recollective experience: with the 
trichotomous classification, the subjects’ recollective experiences 
favored R reports, as opposed to K and F (F (2, 50) ¼ 3.59, MSE ¼ 0.14, p 
¼ .025, ηp2 ¼ 0.13). Finally, there was a significant two-way interaction: 
R reports were increased by semantic processing, while F reports 
decreased; K reports did not differentiate between the two conditions (F 
(2,50) ¼ 7.13, MSE ¼ 0.10, p ¼ .002, ηp2 ¼ 0.22). 
In principle, the trichotomous classification of recollective experi-
ence is vulnerable to the same problem as the conventional dichotomous 
classification: R, K, and F reports are not strictly independent. But this is 
not really the case. Neither K nor and F are residual categories, left over 
after R ratings have been made. Each of the categories has substantive 
meaning. For example, “knowing” in these experiments is not just the 
absence of remembering, but rather refers to abstract knowledge of list 
membership. Nor is “feeling” simply what is left over after items have 
been classified as remembered or known; rather, it refers to an intuitive 
“gut feeling” that suggests that an item had been encountered earlier 
(Fiacconi et al., 2016; Paller et al., 2009; Voss et al., 2012); in the 
absence of such a feeling, an item should not receive an F rating. 
Nevertheless, in order to take account of the problem identified by 
Rajaram (1993), the proportion of items receiving R, K, or F ratings was 
calculated with respect to all studied items, rather than to the proportion 
of items recognized, thus loosening the constraints on each rating to 
some degree. Furthermore, the overall 2 � 3 ANOVA was decomposed 
into three 2 � 2 ANOVAs involving the three pairwise comparisons of R, 
K, and F. Because only two recollective experiences were considered in 
each analysis, excluding the third, the two elements of each pair can be 
considered to be relatively independent of each other. As Table 1 shows, 
R reports increased by 37% from phonemic to semantic encoding; but K 
reports also increased (by 14%), while F reports decreased by 26%. In no 
pairwise comparison is an increase in one variable necessarily offset by a 
comparable decrease in the other. More to the point, K and F may show 
the same pattern of response to level of processing and other indepen-
dent variables, compared to R – in which case we would conclude that K 
and F ratings are similar after all. In these experiments, the general 
hypothesis being tested is that there will be significant main effects and 
interactions involving K and F, supporting the idea that they are, indeed, 
different recollective experiences. 
Considering only R vs. K, the main effect of level of processing was 
significant: as expected, recognition was higher for items receiving se-
mantic processing (F (1, 25) ¼ 22.17, MSE ¼ 0.12, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.47). 
The main effect of recollective experience was also significant: more 
items were rated as R than K (F (1, 25) ¼ 4.53, MSE ¼ 0.20, p ¼ .043, ηp2 
¼ 0.15). The critical two-way interaction was not statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that R and K reports responded similarly to changes in 
level of processing (F (1, 25) ¼ 1.90). 
Considering only R and F, there was no overall level of processing 
effect: the gains made by R items under semantic processing were 
cancelled out by the decline of F items (F < 1). There was a significant 
effect of recollective experience, such that more items received K than F 
ratings (F (1, 25) ¼ 4.80, MSE ¼ 0.23, p ¼ .038, ηp2 ¼ 0.16). The critical 
two-way interaction was highly significant: R was higher following se-
mantic processing, while F was higher following phonemic processing (F 
(1, 25) ¼ 18.39, MSE ¼ 0.20, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.42). 
Considering only K and F, the most important comparison for our 
purposes, the main effect of level of processing was not significant (F (1, 
25) ¼ 1.20); nor was the main effect of recollective experience (F < 1). 
However, the critical two-way interaction was significant: in contrast to 
K, F reports were more frequent following phonemic processing (F (1, 
25) ¼ 4.82, MSE ¼ 0.07, p ¼ .038, ηp2 ¼ 0.16). 
A follow-up t-test, described earlier, confirmed that level of pro-
cessing significantly increased R ratings (t (25) ¼ 3.84, p ¼ .001, Cohen’s 
d ¼ 0.75). The encoding effect on K ratings was in the same direction, 
but not statistically significant (t (25) ¼ 1.09, ns). By contrast, F ratings 
were significantly higher following phonemic encoding (t (25) ¼ 2.63, p 
¼ .014, d ¼ 0.52). 
Response Latencies. Table 2 shows the response latencies associ-
ated with R, K, and F judgments, by encoding condition. A 2 � 3 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of recol-
lective experience (F (2,50) ¼ 9.01, MSE ¼ 8.65, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.27); the 
main effect of level of processing was not significant (F < 1), nor was the 
Table 1 
Experiment 1: Recognition performance. By encoding condition and recollective 
experience.  
Category Proportion of Items Recognized da 
Phonemic Semantic Lure 
All Recognized .75 (.17) .82 (.13) .34 (.03) 1.20 
Remember (R) .27 (.15) .37 (.20) .05 (.01) 1.18 
Not Remembered (NR) .48 (.13) .44 (.14) .30 (.02) 0.42 
Know (K) .22 (.14) .25 (.12) .07 (01) 0.75 
Feel (F) .26 (.11) .19 (.12) .23 (.02) 0.02 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Comparing lures against phonemic and semantic targets combined. 
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two-way interaction (F (2,50) ¼ 2.36, p ¼ .086). 
Averaging across encoding conditions, planned comparisons showed 
that F judgments were associated with significantly longer response la-
tencies than either R judgments (t (25) ¼ 2.99, p ¼ .006) or K judgments 
(t (25) ¼ 4.07, p < .001); the latencies associated with R and K judg-
ments did not differ significantly (t < 1). 
Comparing True and False Recognition. In order to take account 
of responses to lures, responses to target items were summed across the 
two encoding conditions to yield an overall value for correct recognition 
(hits) for comparison to false recognition of lures (false alarms). A 2 � 3 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with two levels of item status (target vs. 
lure) and three levels of recollective experience (R, K, and F) yielded a 
significant main effect of item: there were more hits than false alarms (F 
(1, 25) ¼ 297.36, MSE ¼ 0.84, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.92). There was also a 
significant main effect of recollective experience, with more items – hits 
or false alarms – receiving R or F judgments than K judgments (F (2, 50) 
¼ 5.52, MSE ¼ 0.07, p ¼ .007, ηp2 ¼ 0.18). Most important, there was a 
significant two-way interaction: more hits than false alarms were 
accompanied by R or K judgments, while F judgments were approxi-
mately evenly divided between the two categories (F (2, 50) ¼ 25.54, 
MSE ¼ 0.25, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.51). 
As in the previous analysis, the overall 2 � 3 ANOVA was decom-
posed into three 2 � 2 ANOVAS, one for each pairwise combination of R, 
K, and F. 
Comparing R and K, there was a significant main effect of item: hits 
were greater than false alarms (F (1, 25) ¼ 216.67, MSE ¼ 1.26, p < .001, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.90). The main effect of recollective experience was not significant 
(F (1, 25) ¼ 1.79). However, the two-way interaction was significant: the 
difference between hits and false alarms was somewhat reduced for K 
items (F (1, 25) ¼ 8.52, MSE ¼ 0.08, p ¼ .007, ηp2 ¼ 0.25). 
Comparing R and F, the main effect of item was again significant (F 
(1, 25) ¼ 107.51, MSE ¼ 0.50, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.81). Again, the main 
effect of recollective experience was not significant (F (1, 25) ¼ 3.24, 
MSE ¼ 0.05, p ¼ 084, ηp2 ¼ 0.12). In this comparison, however, the 
critical interaction was much larger, reflecting an increase in the pro-
portion of false alarms receiving F ratings (F (1, 25) ¼ 39.81, MSE ¼
0.49, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.61). 
Comparing K and F, the main effect of item was significant, (F (1, 25) 
¼ 36.28, MSE ¼ 0.18, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.59). The main effect of recol-
lective experience was also significant (F (1, 25) ¼ 14.18, MSE ¼ 0.14, p 
¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.36). Again, the critical two-way interaction was signifi-
cant: far fewer false alarms received K ratings, compared to F (F (1, 25) 
¼ 23.71, MSE ¼ 0.17, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.49). 
Planned comparisons showed that correct recognition of targets was 
much higher than false recognition of lures for both R (t (25) ¼ 9.92, p <
.001, d ¼ 1.93) and K (t (25) ¼ 8.15, p < .001, d ¼ 1.60) items. This was 
not the case for F items, however, which yielded equal proportions of 
hits and false alarms (t (25) ¼ 0.06). 
The average proportions of hits and false alarms displayed in Table 1 
were used for a signal-detection analysis to summarize the accuracy of 
the subjects’ recognition judgments (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005; 
Wickens, 2002). Combining R, K, and F items yielded d’ ¼ 1.20. 
Considering only R and K items also yielded positive values of d’; by 
contrast, F items yielded a d’ essentially at zero, indicating a total failure 
to discriminate between targets and lures. 
5. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 replicated the dissociation between level of processing 
and recollective experience (Remembering vs. Not-Remembering) 
observed by Gardiner, Rajaram, and many others. More important, the 
experiment found a further dissociation between level of processing and 
the more specific judgments of Knowing and Feeling. Deep, semantic 
processing increased both recognition-by-remembering and, to a lesser 
degree, recognition-by-knowing; but shallow, phonemic processing 
increased recognition-by-feeling. Recognition-by-remembering and 
recognition-by-knowing resulted in relatively few false positives, 
compared to recognition-by-feeling. Knowing and Feeling also differed 
in terms of response latencies. Thus, the recollective experiences of 
Knowing and Feeling are dissociable in much the same way that the 
experiences of Remembering and Not-Remembering are. The conven-
tional definition of Not Remembered as a residual category, including 
anything that is not consciously recollected, appears to obscure impor-
tant distinctions between other forms of recollective experience – spe-
cifically, “knowing” that an item was on a list, and intuitively “feeling” 
that it was there. 
Such findings might suggest that Remember, Know, and Feel judg-
ments involve different underlying processes, or are based on retrieval 
from different memory systems – episodic vs. semantic memory, 
perhaps, as Tulving, 1985a, 1985b originally implied (see also Tulving, 
1989, 1999, 2000); or, alternatively, declarative vs. procedural memory 
(Gardiner and Parkin, 1990) or explicit and implicit memory (Wang and 
Yonelinas, 2012). However, it could also be that the various forms of 
recollective experience reflect retrieval from a single memory system, 
and that the categories of Remember, Know, and Feel are proxies for 
different levels of confidence associated with the recognition judgments. 
Both Tulving, 1985a, 1985b and Gardiner (1988) rejected this inter-
pretation, even though Tulving, 1985a, 1985b actually presented some 
evidence favoring it. Gardiner and Java (1990) and Rajaram (1993) 
similarly concluded that the R/K distinction is not merely a proxy for 
confidence. On the other hand, a number of writers have argued from 
signal detection theory that the R/K distinction is a matter of the 
placement of the decision criterion (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; 
Hirshman and Master, 1997; Wixted and Mickes, 2010; Xu and Bellezza, 
2001). It is not clear how different recollective experiences can help but 
be associated with different levels of confidence. If subjects know that 
something happened like they know their own names, that knowledge 
must be associated with high level of confidence; and if they feel that 
something happened, but don’t actually remember it, this must be more 
uncertain. 
Experiment 2 was intended to explore the relationship between 
recollective experience and recognition confidence. A preliminary 
study, in which subjects made confidence ratings on a 1–4 scale in 
addition to judgments of recollective experience, confirmed the prin-
cipal findings of Experiment 1: level of processing at the time of 
encoding had differential effects on K and F; F was associated with more 
false recognitions, and longer response latencies, than K. Liberalizing 
the criterion for recognition increased F reports markedly, especially for 
items studied in the phonemic encoding condition, but had little effect 
on K (or R) reports; it also increased false recognition, especially F re-
ports. And as in Experiment 1, F items were associated with longer 
response latencies than R or K items, which did not differ. 
Experiment 2 employed an alternative approach to examining the 
relationship between recollective experience and confidence levels, by 
specifically instructing subjects to adopt a strict or liberal criterion for 
recognition, following a procedure employed by Dorfman et al. (1995; 
for a similar manipulation in sensory psychophysics, see Tataryn and 
Kihlstrom, 2017). 
5. Method 
Experiment 2 followed same general procedure as Experiment 1: 32 
Table 2 
Experiment 1: Response latencies associated with recollective experience.  
Recollective Experience Encoding Condition 
Phonemic Semantic 
Remember 2.29 (0.52) 2.66 (1.27) 
Know 2.41 (0.92) 2.34 (0.73) 
Feel 3.25 (1.39) 3.01 (1.07) 
Note: Response latencies in seconds. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Yale undergraduates, paid for their time, studied a list of 80 words, 40 in 
the rhyme condition and 40 in the associate condition; 24 h later they 
completed the Yes/No recognition test and RKF ratings. For half the test 
items, the subjects were instructed to adopt a strict criterion for recog-
nition – not to endorse an item unless they were relatively sure: 
Say “Yes” only if you are relatively certain that the word appeared on 
the presentation list. If you’re fairly sure you say the word, then you 
should say “yes”. If you’re not so sure or don’t think you say the word, 
you should say “no”. 
For the remainder, they were instructed to adopt a liberal criterion – 
to endorse items that seemed familiar in any way, even if they did not 
actually remember them: 
You can say “Yes” even if you’re not sure that you saw the word. If 
you think you might have seen the word, or if it seems familiar to you at 
all, then you should say “yes”. If it doesn’t seem familiar to you, you 
should say “no”. 
6. Results 
Table 3 shows the proportion of items recognized in each condition 
of the experiment. Again in the interests of space, the analyses omit the 
traditional, dichotomous, Remember-Not Remember (R/N) distinction, 
and focus on the trichotomous classification, dividing “Not Remem-
bered” (N) items into subcategories of Know (K) and Feel (F) as opposed 
to Remember (R). 
Trichotomous Distinctions Among Remembering, Knowing, and 
Feeling. Analysis began with an overall 2 � 2 � 3 ANOVA with two 
levels of encoding (phonemic or semantic), two levels of response cri-
terion (strict or liberal), and three levels of recollective experience (R, K, 
or F). This revealed a significant main effect of encoding, with higher 
levels of recognition for items studied in the semantic condition (F (1, 
31) ¼ 7.67, MSE ¼ 0.04, p ¼ .009, ηp2 ¼ 0.20). The main effect of 
response criterion was significant, with higher recognition levels under 
the liberal standard (F (1, 31) ¼ 24.07, MSE ¼ 0.18, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.44). 
The main effect of recollective experience was also significant: 
compared to R items, there were far fewer K and F items (F (1, 62) ¼
8.33, MSE ¼ 0.96, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.21). The encoding-by-criterion 
interaction was not significant (F (1, 31) ¼ 1.11), but the remaining 
two-way interactions were. The interaction of criterion with recollective 
experience was significant, as the proportion of F responses increased 
under the liberal criterion (F (2, 62) ¼ 4.36, MSE ¼ 0.10, p ¼ .017, ηp2 ¼
0.12). Most important was the significant interaction between encoding 
condition and recollective experience, such that F reports were more 
frequent for items studied in the phonemic encoding condition (F (2, 62) 
¼ 12.49, MSE ¼ 0.38, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.29). The three-way interaction 
was not significant (F < 1). 
Following the model of previous analyses, the overall three-way 
ANOVA was decomposed into three 2 � 2 � 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVAs, one for each pairwise combination of R, K, and F within 
each criterion. 
Considering only R and K, recognition was higher following semantic 
encoding (F (1, 31) ¼ 20.10, MSE ¼ 0.38, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.39), and more 
items were rated R than K (F (1, 31) ¼ 15.49, MSE ¼ 1.81, p < .,001, ηp2 
¼ 0.33), but in this case there was no main effect of the criterion for 
recognition (F < 1). Of the two-way interactions, only the interaction of 
encoding and recollective experience was significant: K judgments were 
more frequent following semantic encoding (F (1, 31) ¼ 4.59, MSE ¼
0.14, p ¼ .040, ηp2 ¼ 0.13). For the interactions of criterion x encoding 
and criterion vs. recollective experience (both Fs < 1). The three-way 
interaction was not significant (F < 1). All in all, R and K judgments 
behaved quite similarly in all conditions of the experiment. 
Considering the interaction between R and F, the main effect of 
encoding was not significant (F ¼ 1.30). As expected, there was a main 
effect of recognition criterion, with more items recognized under the 
more liberal standard (F (1, 31) ¼ 13.27, MSE ¼ 0.18, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼
0.30). There was also a main effect of recollective experience, with more 
recognized items receiving R than F judgments (F (1, 31) ¼ 6.89, MSE ¼
0.93, p ¼ .013, ηp2 ¼ 0.18). The main effect of encoding condition was not 
significant (F ¼ 1.30), nor was the interaction of recognition criterion 
with encoding condition (F ¼ 1.92, p ¼ .175). However, the interaction 
of recognition criterion was significant: loosening the criterion for 
recognition increased F but not R judgments (F (1, 31) ¼ 6.56, MSE ¼
0.19, p ¼ .016, ηp2 ¼ 0.18). There was an even stronger interaction be-
tween encoding condition and recollective experience: semantic 
encoding increased R judgments, while phonemic encoding increased F 
judgments (F (1, 31) ¼ 17.65, MSE ¼ 0.76, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.36). The 
three-way interaction was not significant (F < 1). 
A similar pattern of results was obtained with the most critical 
interaction, involving K and F judgments. Again, there was a main effect 
of recognition criterion, with more items recognized under the more 
liberal standard (F (1, 31) ¼ 22.06, MSE ¼ 0.28, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.42). The 
main effect of encoding was also significant (F (1, 31) ¼ 6.13, MSE ¼
0.07, p ¼ .019, ηp2 ¼ 0.17). There was no main effect of recollective 
experience: nonrecognized items were evenly split between K and F 
judgments (F ¼ 1.54). Nor was the encoding � criterion interaction 
significant (F < 1). However, the interaction of criterion and recollective 
experience was significant: F judgments increased under the liberal 
criterion, but K judgments did not (F (1, 31) ¼ 5.85, MSE ¼ 0.10, p ¼
.022, ηp2 ¼ 0.16). The encoding x recollective experience interaction was 
also significant: F judgments, but not K judgments, increased under 
phonemic encoding (F (1, 31) ¼ 13.68, MSE ¼ 0.24, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.31). 
Again, the three-way interaction was not significant (F < 1). 
Planned comparisons confirmed the differential effects of level of 
processing on recollective experience found in Experiment 1. Collapsing 
across the two recognition criteria, semantic processing produced an 
increase in R reports, compared to phonemic processing (t (31) ¼ 3.62, p 
¼ .001, d ¼ 0.64). K responses were in the same direction, but the dif-
ference was not significant (t (31) ¼ 1.53, ns). However, there were 
significantly more F responses following phonemic processing responses 
respectively (t (31) ¼ 4.14, p < .001, d ¼ 0.73). 
Another set of planned comparisons, combining the phonemic and 
semantic encoding conditions, showed that loosening the criterion for 
recognition increased F responses (t (31) ¼ 4.46, p < .001, d ¼ 0.79). 
However, shifting the criterion had little effect on K responses (t (31) ¼
1.37, ns), and no effect at all on R responses (t < 1.). 
Response Latencies. Table 4 shows the response latencies associ-
ated with R, K, and F judgments under the various conditions. A 2 � 2 �
3 repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of recol-
lective experience (F (2, 62) ¼ 17.21, MSE ¼ 90.35, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.36). 
There was also a significant two-way interaction of criterion with rec-
ollective experience (F (2, 62) ¼ 3.58, MSE ¼ 5.57, p ¼ .034, ηp2 ¼ 0.10). 
No other main effects or interactions were significant: criterion, F < 1; 
encoding, F < 1; criterion x encoding, F (1, 31) ¼ 3.10, ns; encoding x 
recollective experience, F < 1; criterion x encoding x recollective 
Table 3 
Experiment 2: Recognition performance. By encoding condition, response cri-
terion, and recollective experience.  
Recollective Experience Proportion of Items Recognized d’ 
Phonemic Semantic Lure 
Strict Criterion 
All Recognized .69 (.21) .77 (.18) .26 (.16) 1.26 
Remember (R) .29 (.20) .43 (.20) .06 (.07) 1.21 
Know (K) .16 (.17) .19 (.15) .06 (.07) 0.63 
Feel (F) .23 (.14) .14 (.09) .14 (.10) 0.22 
Liberal Criterion 
All Recognized .84 (.18) .88 (.13) .50 (.23) 1.08 
Remember (R) .30 (.23) .42 (.22) .07 (.08) 1.11 
Know (K) .19 (.17) .22 (.17) .08 (08) 0.59 
Feel (F) .34 (.23) .24 (.17) .35 (.18)   0.17 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
aComparing lures against phonemic and semantic targets combined. 
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experience, F (2, 62) ¼ 1.46. 
Planned comparisons showed, again, that the response latencies of R 
and K judgments did not differ significantly, regardless of the recogni-
tion criterion (Strict: t (31) ¼ 0.60; Liberal: t (31) ¼ 1.11). By contrast, F 
judgments were associated with significantly longer response latencies 
than either R or K judgments. This was true under the liberal criterion (F 
vs. R: t (31) ¼ 3.21, p ¼ .003; F vs K: t (31) ¼ 2.92, p ¼ .006), but 
especially under the strict criterion (F vs. R: t (31) ¼ 5.10, p < .001; F vs. 
K: t (31) ¼ 4.34, p < .001). 
Comparing Targets and Lures. As in the previous experiments, 
responses to target items were summed across the two encoding con-
ditions for comparison to lures (Table 3). An overall 2 � 2 � 3 repeated- 
measures ANOVA showed that all three main effects were significant: 
hits exceeded false alarms (F (1, 31) ¼ 308.76, MSE ¼ 1.83, p < .001, ηp2 
¼ 0.91); positive responses increased under the liberal criterion (F (1, 
31) ¼ 48.19, MSE ¼ 0.36, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.61); and there were relatively 
few K responses, compared to R or F (F (2, 62) ¼ 8.63, MSE ¼ 0.42, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.22). All three two-way interactions were also significant: 
false alarms more than doubled under the liberal criterion (F (1, 31) ¼
13.39, MSE ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.30); loosening the criterion for 
recognition also increased the proportion of F responses (F (2, 62) ¼
18.62, MSE ¼ 0.22, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.38); and false alarms were usually 
accompanied by F reports (F (2, 62) ¼ 34.68, MSE ¼ 0.72, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.53). The three-way interaction also reached significance: false alarms 
under the liberal criterion was especially likely to be accompanied by F 
reports (F (2, 62) ¼ 3.73, MSE ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .030, ηp2 ¼ 0.11). 
As before, the overall ANOVA was decomposed into three 2 � 2 � 2 
ANOVAS, one for each pairwise combination of R, K, and F reports. 
Comparing R and K, the main effect of criterion was not significant: 
loosening the criterion for recognition had little effect on overall 
recognition (F (1, 31) ¼ 1.97). The main effect of item status, however, 
was highly significant: correct hits were much more frequent than false 
alarms (F (1, 31) ¼ 217.08, MSE ¼ 2.79, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.88). And the 
main effect of recollective experience was also significant: whether hits 
or false alarms, recognition was more likely to be accompanied by R 
than K reports (F (1, 31) ¼ 9.64, MSE ¼ 0.43, p ¼ .004, ηp2 ¼ 0.24). The 
two-way interaction between item status and recollective experience 
was significant: K reports increased somewhat for hits under the more 
liberal criterion (F (1, 31) ¼ 23.59, MSE ¼ 0.48, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.43). 
Otherwise, however, R and K reports behaved quite similarly: the 
remaining two-way interactions, of criterion with item status and cri-
terion with recollective experience, were both nonsignificant, as was the 
three-way interaction (all F < 1). 
Comparing R and F, there were significant main effects of criterion 
and item status: recognition increased as the criterion shifted from strict 
to liberal (F (1, 31) ¼ 37.45, MSE ¼ 0.42, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.55), and hits 
exceeded false alarms (F (1, 31) ¼ 93.68, MSE ¼ 1.36, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.75). There was no significant effect of recollective experience: the high 
proportion of hits given R ratings was balanced by the high proportion of 
false alarms given F ratings (F < 1). The two-way interaction of criterion 
with item status was also significant: false recognition of lures increased 
with the loosened criterion (F (1, 31) ¼ 13.88, MSE ¼ 0.05, p ¼ .001, ηp2 
¼ 0.31). Both two-way interactions involving recollective experience 
were significant: F reports increased substantially under the liberal cri-
terion (F (1, 31) ¼ 24.91, MSE ¼ 0.36, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.45); and F reports 
were more frequently associated with false alarms than with hits (F (1, 
31) ¼ 62.07, MSE ¼ 1.43, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.67). The three-way inter-
action was not significant (F (1, 31) ¼ 3.00, p ¼ .093). 
For the critical comparison of K and F, all three main effects were 
significant, as were all three two-way interactions and the three-way 
interaction. Hits exceeded false alarms (F (1, 31) ¼ 42.35, MSE ¼
0.22, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.58); more items were endorsed under the liberal 
criterion (F (1, 31) ¼ 56.99, MSE ¼ 0.51, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.65); and more 
items received F than K ratings (F (1, 31) ¼ 18.78, MSE ¼ 0.79, p < .001, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.38). Employing the liberal criterion increased false alarms (F (1, 
31) ¼ 6.29, MSE ¼ 0.04, p ¼ .018, ηp2 ¼ 0.17); F ratings increased more 
than K ratings under the liberal criterion (F (1, 31) ¼ 22.37, MSE ¼ 0.28, 
p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.42); and F ratings increased more for false alarms than 
for hits (F (1, 31) ¼ 13.35, MSE ¼ 0.26, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.30). In the 
significant three-way interaction, F judgments, but not K judgments, 
increased markedly for false alarms when the criterion for recognition 
was loosened (F (1, 31) ¼ 8.78, MSE ¼ 0.05, p ¼ .006, ηp2 ¼ 0.22). 
Planned comparisons, aggregating across the two encoding condi-
tions, showed that under the strict criterion hits exceeded false alarms in 
all three categories of recollective experience: R, t (31) ¼ 11.30, p <
.001, d ¼ 2.00; K, t (31) ¼ 6.14, p < .001, d ¼ 1.09; F, t (31) ¼ 2.59, p ¼
.015, d ¼ 0.46. When the criterion was loosened, R judgments were 
essentially unchanged, with respect to both hits and false alarms (both t 
< 1). With respect to K responses, there was a small and nonsignificant 
increase in K for both hits (t (31) ¼ 1.37) and false alarms (t (31) ¼ 1.93). 
For F items, by contrast, relaxing the criterion significantly increased 
hits by more than 50% (t (31) ¼ 4.46, p < .001, d ¼ 0.79), and more than 
doubled false alarms (t (31) ¼ 6.58, p < .001, d ¼ 1.16). Under the 
liberal criterion, hits continued to outweigh false alarms for both R (t 
(31) ¼ 8.82, p < .001, d ¼ 1.56 and K (t (31) ¼ 6.25, p < .001, d ¼ 1.11) 
judgments. For F items, however, false alarms numerically exceeded 
hits, although the difference was not significant (t (31) ¼ 1.63). 
Signal-detection analysis (Table 3) showed that sensitivity remained 
high for R items under both recognition criteria. The sensitivity of K 
judgments also remained stable and moderately positive, while that of F 
judgments was low under the strict criterion and dropped below zero 
when the criterion was loosened. 
7. Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 showed that F ratings increased markedly as the cri-
terion for recognition was loosened, but this was not the case for R or K 
ratings. Again, remembering and knowing were associated with rela-
tively rapid responses, while recognition-by-feeling took significantly 
longer. Experiment 3 picked up on this last finding, employing a 
“response window” technique to control the amount of time that sub-
jects had to make their recognition judgments. 
8. Method 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, 35 Yale undergraduates first studied a list 
of 80 words presented by computer under a levels-of-processing 
manipulation, generating rhymes for half the words and associates for 
the remainder. After a retention interval of 24 h, the subjects returned to 
the laboratory for the recognition task. Each target or lure first appeared 
on the computer screen for 1.5, 3.0, 4.5, or 6.0 s; then, while the word 
remained fixed in place, the recognition query (“Remember, Know, Feel, 
or No?”) appeared on the screen. The subjects were given an additional 
1 s to make their response: pressing N if the item was new; or, if the item 
was old, pressing R, K, or F according to his or her recollective experi-
ence. The subjects were instructed to make their recognition responses 
only within this 1-s window; responses made before or after this interval 
were discarded. 
Table 4 
Experiment 2: Response latencies associated with recollective experience.  
Recollective Experience Encoding Condition 
Phonemic Semantic 
Strict Criterion 
Remember 2.81 (1.41) 2.96 (1.39) 
Know 2.79 (1.24) 3.24 (1.92) 
Feel 4.87 (3.54) 4.64 (3.31) 
Liberal Criterion 
Remember 2.96 (1.42) 3.02 (1.44) 
Know 3.53 (1.94) 2.91 (1.48) 
Feel 4.54 (3.47) 3.85 (2.44) 
Note: Response latencies in seconds. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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9. Results 
Again in the interests of space, the analyses omit the traditional, 
dichotomous, Remember-Not Remember (R/N) distinction, and focus on 
the trichotomous classification, dividing “Not Remembered” (N) items 
into subcategories of Know (K) and Feel (F) as opposed to Remember 
(R). The subjects’ average response time, across all conditions of the 
experiment, was 0.45 s after the response window closed. In view of the 
response-window manipulation, response latencies were not analyzed 
further. 
Trichotomous Classification of Recollective Experience. Table 5 
shows the proportion of targets and lures recognized in each response 
window. An overall 2 � 4 � 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, with 2 levels 
of processing (phonemic vs. semantic), 4 response windows, and 3 cat-
egories of recollective experience, yielded the usual levels of processing 
effect (F (1, 34) ¼ 24.54, MSE ¼ 0.26, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.42). The main 
effect of response window was also significant: recognition progressively 
improved as subjects had more time to make their decisions (F (3, 102) 
¼ 20.63, MS ¼ 0.15, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.38). The main effect of recollective 
experience was also significant, with a plurality of items given R ratings, 
and the remainder about evenly divided between K and F (F (2, 68) ¼
26.22, MSE ¼ 3.67, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.44). The two-way interaction be-
tween encoding and response window reached significance: the differ-
ence between the phonemic and semantic conditions increased as the 
response window widened (F (3, 102) ¼ 3.32, MSE ¼ 0.02, p ¼ .023, ηp2 
¼ 0.09). More important, there was also a significant two-way interac-
tion of encoding with recollective experience: R items dominated in the 
semantic encoding condition, while F items dominated in the phonemic 
encoding condition; K items were balanced between conditions (F (2, 
68) ¼ 20.80, MSE ¼ 1.08, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.38). The two-way interaction 
between response window and recollective experience was not signifi-
cant (F ¼ 1.36), but the three-way interaction did achieve significance: 
as the response window opened, F judgments became more frequent, 
especially for items in the phonemic encoding condition; R judgments 
also became more frequent, but especially for items in the semantic 
encoding condition; K judgments remained constant (F (6, 204) ¼ 4.31, 
MSE ¼ 0.08, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.11). 
These effects were further unpacked with a series of 2 (encoding) x4 
(response window) x 2 (recollective experience) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs, for each pairwise combination of R, K, and F, and focusing 
on the interactions involving recollective experience. 
Comparing R and K, all the main effects were significant: encoding, F 
(1, 34) ¼ 42.24, MSE ¼ 1.13, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.55; response window, F (3, 
102) ¼ 5.76, MSE ¼ 0.60, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.15; recollective experience, F 
(1, 34) ¼ 40.98, MSE ¼ 6.89, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.55. The encoding �
window interaction was also significant, F (3, 102) ¼ 10.62, MSE ¼ 0.90, 
p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.24. As the response window widened, R responses 
increased, but K responses did not. The more relevant interaction of 
encoding with recollective experience was significant: R items increased 
markedly with semantic encoding, but K items did not (F (1, 34) ¼
14.20, MSE ¼ 0.92, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.30). The interaction of response 
window with recollective experience was not significant (F ¼ 1.54); nor 
was the three-way interaction (F (3, 102) ¼ 2.17, p ¼ .096). 
Comparing R and F, the main effects were again all significant: 
encoding condition, F (1, 34) ¼ 14.28, MSE ¼ 0.34, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.30; 
response window, F (3, 102) ¼ 13.19, MSE ¼ 0.19, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.28; 
recollective experience, F (1, 34) ¼ 18.81, MSE ¼ 3.60, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.36. The interaction between encoding condition and response window 
was not significant (F ¼ 1.53). However, the interaction between 
encoding and recollective experience was: R items increased substan-
tially in the semantic encoding condition, whereas F items actually 
decreased with semantic encoding (F (1, 34) ¼ 31.29, MSE ¼ 2.08, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.48). The interaction between response window and recol-
lective experience was not significant (F < 1). However, the three-way 
interaction was (F3, 102) ¼ 7.75, MSE ¼ 2.81, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.19). 
A series of 2 � 2 ANOVAs, one for each response window, confirmed 
that the differential effect of encoding on R and F (i.e., the encoding by 
recollective experience interaction) was especially large at the 6-sec 
window: 1.5 s, F (1, 34) ¼ 9.90, MSE ¼ 0.26, p ¼ .003, ηp2 ¼ 0.23; 3.0 
s, F (1, 34) ¼ 15.64, MSE ¼ 0.59, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.32; 4.5 s, F (1, 34) ¼
3.09, MSE ¼ 0.11, ns; 6.0 s, F (1, 34) ¼ 54.76, MSE ¼ 1.61, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.62. 
Comparing K and F, the three main effects of the 2 � 4 � 2 ANOVA 
were again significant: encoding, F (1,34) ¼ 6.24, MSE ¼ 0.15, p ¼ .017, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.16; response window, F (3, 102) ¼ 6.31, MSE ¼ 0.08, p ¼ .001, ηp2 
¼ 0.16; recollective experience, F (1, 34) ¼ 8.72, MSE ¼ 0.53, p ¼ .006, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.20. The two-way interaction of encoding and window was not 
significant (F ¼ 1.54), nor was the interaction of window and recol-
lective experience (F ¼ 2.24) or the three-way interaction (F ¼ 2.52). 
However, the critical interaction of encoding condition and recollective 
experience was significant: F responses were greater following phone-
mic encoding, but K responses were not (F (1, 34) ¼ 9.65, MSE ¼ 0.23, p 
¼ .004, ηp2 ¼ 0.22). 
Aggregating across the four response windows, R responses were 
higher following semantic processing (t (34) ¼ 5.52, p < .001, d ¼ 0.93), 
but there was no difference for K responses (t (34) < 1). By contrast, F 
responses were higher following phonemic processing (t (34) ¼ 4.04, p 
< .001, d ¼ 0.68). 
Comparing True and False Recognition. As before, the phonemic 
and semantic encoding conditions were combined to yield overall hit 
rate for targets, to be compared to false alarms to lures. The overall 2 �
4 � 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, with 2 levels of item status (targets vs. 
lures), 4 levels of response window (1.5, 3.0, 4.5, and 6.0 s), and 3 levels 
of recollective experience (R, K, and F) showed that all three main effects 
were significant: more targets than lures were recognized (F (1, 34) ¼
346.14, MSE ¼ 4.05, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.91); recognition (true or false) 
increased with expanding response window (F (3, 102) ¼ 29.96, MSE ¼
0.12, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.47); and more items (targets or lures) received R or 
F ratings, compared to K (F (2, 68) ¼ 18.30, MSE ¼ 0.91, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.35). The item status � window interaction was not significant (F ¼
1.87). However, the two-way interaction of item status and recollective 
experience was significant: more targets received R ratings, compared to 
K and F, while more lures received F ratings, compared to R and K (F (2, 
68) ¼ 49.53, MSE ¼ 1.75, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.59). The response window x 
recollective experience interaction was also significant: both R and F 
responses increased with the expanding response window, while K 
Table 5 
Experiment 3: Recognition performance. By encoding condition, response win-
dow, and recollective experience.  
Recollective Experience Proportion of Items Recognized d’a 
Phonemic Semantic Lure 
Window: 1.5 Seconds 
All Recognized .60 (.23) .62 (.18) .22 (.14) 1.05 
Remember .27 (.19) .37 (.22) .05 (.07) 1.18 
Know .14 (.14) .13 (.12) .05 (.07) 0.52 
Feel .19 (.14) .13 (.15) .12 (.09) 0.18 
Window: 3.0 Seconds 
All Recognized .65 (.22) .79 (.19) .29 (.18) 1.14 
Remember .27 (.18) .46 (.26) .06 (.07) 1.22 
Know .15 (.13) .17 (.18) .05 (06) 0.65 
Feel .23 (.18) .16 (.15) .18 (.12) 0.04 
Window: 4.5 Seconds 
All Recognized .72 (.23) .81 (.17) .38 (.22) 1.01 
Remember .35 (.24) .45 (.24) .04 (.06) 1.50 
Know .13 (.14) .14 (.16) .11 (.14) 0.15 
Feel .23 (.14) .22 (.14) .23 (.12)   0.02 
Window: 6 Seconds 
All Recognized .70 (.20) .87 (.13) .34 (.19) 1.22 
Remember .24 (.21) .53 (.23) .05 (.06) 1.34 
Know .14 (.12) .17 (.15) .05 (.07) 0.61 
Feel .32 (.16) .18 (.13) .23 (.13) 0.06 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Comparing lures against phonemic and semantic targets combined. 
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responses held fairly steady (F (6, 204) ¼ 3.19, MSE ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .005, ηp2 
¼ 0.09). The three-way interaction was also significant: the increase in F 
responses was especially prominent for lures (F (6, 204) ¼ 2.46, MSE ¼
0.02, p ¼ .026, ηp2 ¼ 0.07). 
The overall analysis was decomposed into separate 2 � 4 � 2 
repeated-measures ANOVAs, one for each pairwise combination of R, K, 
and F, and emphasizing the interactions involving recollective 
experience. 
Comparing R and K, all three main effects were significant: more 
targets than lures were recognized (F (1, 34) ¼ 292.29, MSE ¼ 5.57, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.90); recognition (true and false) increased as the response 
window expanded (F (3, 102) ¼ 7.89, MSE ¼ 0.03, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.19); 
and more recognized items received R ratings compared to K (F (1, 34) 
¼ 24.81, MSE ¼ 1.51, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.42). The item status � window 
interaction did not reach significance (F (3, 102) ¼ 2.48, p ¼ .066), and 
the interaction of response window with recollective experience was 
clearly nonsignificant (F < 1). However, the item status x recollective 
experience interaction was highly significant: targets yielded far more R 
than K responses, but R and K were fairly evenly divided among lures (F 
(1, 34) ¼ 50.56, MSE ¼ 1.95, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.60). The three-way 
interaction was significant: (F (3, 102) ¼ 4.36, MSE ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .006, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.11). 
Comparing R and F, the main effects of item status and response 
window were both significant: more targets than lures were endorsed on 
the recognition test (F (1, 34) ¼ 283.05, MSE ¼ 3.93, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.89), and recognition (true or false) increased as the response window 
expanded (F3, 102) ¼ 21.02, MSE ¼ 0.13, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.38). The main 
effect of recollective experience was not significant (F < 1), because so 
many falsely recognized lures received F judgments. The two-way 
interaction of item status with response window was also not signifi-
cant (F < 1). However, the interaction of item status with recollective 
experience was highly significant: more targets received R ratings, while 
more lures received F ratings (F (1, 34) ¼ 59.41, MSE ¼ 3.15, p < .001, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.64). The interaction of response window with recollective expe-
rience was also significant: F ratings increased as the response window 
expanded, while R ratings held fairly steady F (3, 102) ¼ 3.44, MSE ¼
0.03, p ¼ .020, ηp2 ¼ 0.09). The three-way interaction was not significant 
(F ¼ 2.33, p ¼ .079). 
Comparing K and F, all three main effects were significant: overall, 
more targets than lures were recognized (F (1, 34) ¼ 13.31, MSE ¼ 0.34, 
p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.28); more items of either type were endorsed as the 
window opened (F (3, 102) ¼ 18.52, MSE ¼ 0.11, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.35); 
and more items of either type received F than K ratings (F (1, 34) ¼
40.08, MSE ¼ 1.22, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ ..54) The two-way interaction be-
tween item status and response window reached significance: F re-
sponses increased with expanding response window, but K responses did 
not (F 3, 102) ¼ 3.30, MSE ¼ 0.02, p ¼ .023, ηp2 ¼ 0.09). The interaction 
of item status and recollective experience was stronger: targets received 
more K than F ratings, while the reverse was true for lures (F (1, 34) ¼
10.02, MSE ¼ 0.14, p ¼ .003, ηp2 ¼ 0.23). The interaction of response 
window with recollective experience was also significant: F ratings 
increased as the response window expanded, but K ratings did not (F (3, 
102) ¼ 5.88, MSE ¼ 0.04, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.15). The three-way inter-
action was not significant (F < 1). 
Follow-up one-way ANOVAs showed that R responses to targets 
increased across response windows (F (3, 102) ¼ 4.23, MSE ¼ 0.04, p ¼
.007, ηp2 ¼ 0.11), while R responses to lures remained constant (F < 1). 
By contrast, K responses to targets remained constant across response 
windows (F < 1), while K responses to lures increased in the 4.5-sec 
window (F (3, 102) ¼ 6.81, MSE ¼ 0.03, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.17). F re-
sponses increased across response windows for both targets (F (3, 102) 
¼ 5.75, MSE ¼ 0.06, p ¼ .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.11), and, especially, lures (F (3, 
102) ¼ 13.22, MSE ¼ 0.08, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.28). 
For the signal-detection analysis (Table 5), the phonemic and se-
mantic items were combined for comparison to the lures. Setting aside 
the different recollective experiences, overall recognition performance 
was quite good. Performance was even better considering only R items. 
For K items, accuracy was somewhat lower at each response window. 
For F items, however, performance was quite poor even with the shortest 
response window and fell off rapidly as the window widened. 
10. Experiment 4 
Experiments 1–3 revealed many differences between knowing and 
feeling, as predicted, but also many similarities between knowing and 
remembering. Both were enhanced by deep processing and repeated 
study; both were associated with high confidence levels, high accuracy, 
and relatively short response latencies. These findings are irrelevant to 
the distinction between knowing and feeling that lies at the heart of this 
research, but they leave the qualitative distinction between remem-
bering and knowing somewhat in doubt. On reflection, it would seem 
that recognition-by-knowing is most likely to occur under one of two 
circumstances: over long retention intervals, or with repetition of closely 
similar events. Long retention intervals might promote degradation of 
the spatial and temporal cues which mark the episode as a unique 
experience; repetition might blur them beyond recognition. Further-
more, a great deal of “semantic” knowledge is acquired through repe-
tition, after all. Tulving (1989; Tulving et al., 1988) showed that the 
densely amnesic patient K.C. could acquire new knowledge about his 
own past, through extensive repetition of the facts, even though he could 
not remember any specific episodes of personal experience. Conway, 
Dewhurst, and others have documented an “R-to-K shift” (Conway et al., 
1997) or process of “schematization” (Herbert and Burt, 2004) in the 
acquisition of semantic knowledge, by which learners lose track of the 
episodic context in which new knowledge was acquired, while retaining 
access to the knowledge itself. 
A preliminary experiment found that R and K judgments increased, 
and F judgments decreased, over two study-test trials separated by 24 h 
– each trial consisting of the same targets, but constructed to represent a 
distinctly different learning episode. Experiment 4 was intended to 
explore the effects of massed learning trials on recollective experience. 
11. Method 
In this experiment, 44 undergraduates at the University of California, 
Berkeley participated in 15 study-test trials with a 20-item list con-
ducted over a period of 90 min. Items were read aloud at a rate of one 
every 3 s. After a 10-min interval in which the subjects generated word 
associations and listened to the instructions for rating their recollective 
experience, they received their first test trial, making recognition 
judgments for 20 targets and 20 lures listed in random order on a single 
sheet of paper. Successive study-test cycles consumed about 3–1/2 min 
each. On each study trial, the targets were presented in a new random 
order, and on each test trial the targets and lures was presented in a new 
random order. The subjects were run in small groups of 4–5 individuals, 
and were paid for their participation. 
12. Results 
Fig. 1 shows the trial-by-trial performance of the experiment. To 
reduce clutter along the horizontal axis, results for lures are omitted; in 
fact, false recognition of lures occurred rarely. As intended, the subjects 
learned the list fairly quickly: On Trial 1, they recognized an average of 
16.27 targets (SD ¼ 3.11), and made very few false alarms (M ¼ 1.41, SD 
¼ 1.30). Early in the series of trials, the subjects showed the familiar mix 
of remembering, knowing, and feeling. Very quickly, however, feeling 
dropped out of the picture, as did false alarms, and experiences of 
knowing replaced experiences of remembering. 
Trichotomous Classification of Recollective Experience. For 
simplicity in exposition and analysis, Table 6 shows the results only for 
Trials 1, 5, 10, and 15. A 4 � 3 repeated-measures ANOVA showed 
significant main effects of both trial and recollective experience. 
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Recognition increased across trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 45.48, MSE ¼ 0.10, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.51), and there were more of both R and K judgments, 
compared to F (F (2, 86) ¼ 226.31, MSE ¼ 8.79, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.84). The 
two-way interaction of trials with recollective experience was also sig-
nificant (F (6, 258) ¼ 64.57, MSE ¼ 1.44, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.60). 
This overall ANOVA was then decomposed into three separate 4 � 2 
ANOVAs, one for each pairwise combination of R, K, and F. 
For the critical comparison of R and K, the ANOVA yielded a sig-
nificant main effect of trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 69.77, MSE ¼ 0.35, p < .001, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.62). The main effect of recollective experience was not significant 
(F (1, 43) ¼ 3.51, MSE ¼ 0.23, p ¼ .068), owing to the almost-perfect 
crossover interaction (F (3, 129) ¼ 69.14, MSE ¼ 2.54, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.62). Recognition was accompanied by remembering on early trials, 
but by knowing on later trials. 
For the comparison of R and F, the ANOVA yielded significant main 
effects of both trial (F (3, 129) ¼ 51.78, MSE ¼ 0.58, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.55) 
and recollective experience (F (1, 43) ¼ 453.79, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.91), as 
well as a significant interaction (F (3, 129) ¼ 8.32, MSE ¼ 0.13, p < .001, 
ηp2 ¼ 0.16). R judgments increased and then decreased, while F judg-
ments only decreased. 
A similar pattern was observed in the comparison of K and F judg-
ments, except that K judgments increased throughout: main effect of 
trials, F (3, 129) ¼ 67.39, MSE ¼ 0.72, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.61; main effect of 
recollective experience, F (1, 43) ¼ 643.87, MSE ¼ 11.33, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.94; interaction, F (3, 129) ¼ 113.57, MSE ¼ 1.66, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.73. 
Comparing True and False Recognition. Adding an “item” factor 
(hits vs. false alarms) for a 4 � 2 � 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, again 
considering only Trials 1, 5, 10, and 15 (Table 6), all the effects 
described above remained significant: trials, F (3, 129) ¼ 14.64, MSE ¼
0.2, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.25; recollective experience, F (2, 86) ¼ 201.23, 
MSE ¼ 4.05, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.82; trials by recollective experience, F (6, 
258) ¼ 69.57, MSE ¼ 0.81, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.62. In addition, the new 
main effect of item status was significant, with hits far outweighing false 
alarms (F (1, 43) ¼ 15,952.45, MSE ¼ 24.62, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.99). The 
interaction of item with trials was also significant: hits increased over 
trials, while false alarms decreased (F (3, 129) ¼ 79.48, MSE ¼ 0.10, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.65). So was the interaction of item status with recollective 
experience: R and K judgments increased across trials, while F judg-
ments decreased (F (2, 86) ¼ 248.76, MSE ¼ 7.14, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.85). 
And the three-way interaction was also significant (F (6, 258) ¼ 58.68, 
MSE ¼ 0.66, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.58). 
The reduced dataset also served as the basis for a series of three 4 � 2 
� 2 ANOVAs involving all pairwise comparisons of R, K, and F ratings. 
For the critical comparison between R and K, the ANOVA yielded 
significant main effects of trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 71.68, MSE ¼ 0.19, p <
.001, ηp2 ¼ 0.63) and item status (F (1, 43) ¼ 10,212.12, MSE ¼ 33.86, p 
< .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.99). The two-way interaction of trials with item status 
was also significant: hits went up over trials, while false alarms went 
down (F (3, 129) ¼ 65.18, MSE ¼ 0.16, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.60). The main 
effect of recollective experience was not significant (F (1, 43) ¼ 2.78, 
MSE ¼ 0.10, p ¼ .103, ηp2 ¼ 0.06), because of the significant crossover 
interaction with trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 70.99, MSE ¼ 1.31, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.62). The interaction of item status and recollective experience reached 
significance: hits generally received R and K ratings, while there was 
little differentiation among the very few false alarms (F (1, 43) ¼ 4.34, 
MSE ¼ 0.14, p ¼ .043, ηp2 ¼ 0.09). The three-way interaction was highly 
significant: the crossover between R and K observed with hits was not 
observed with false alarms (F (3, 129) ¼ 66.91, MSE ¼ 1.23, p < .001, ηp2 
Fig. 1. Distribution of Remember, Know, and Feel ratings on each trial of Experiment 4. Error bars indicate standard errors around each mean.  
Table 6 
Experiment 4: Recognition performance. By trial and recollective experience.  
Recollective Experience Target Lure d’a 
Trial 1 
All Recognized .81 (.16) .07 (.06) 2.35 
Remember .55 (.16) .00 (.00) 2.45 
Know .15 (.13) .00 (.00) 1.29 
Feel .11 (.11) .07 (.06) 0.25 
Trial 5 
All Recognized .96 (.05) .00 (.00) 4.08 
Remember .58 (.18) .00 (.00) 2.53 
Know .31 (.15) .00 (.00) 1.83 
Feel .08 (.09) .00 (.00) 0.92 
Trial 10 
All Recognized .99 (.02) .01 (.02) 4.65 
Remember .40 (.17) .00 (.00) 2.07 
Know .56 (.17) .01 (.02) 2.48 
Feel .03 (.06) .00 (.00) 0.45 
Trial 15 
All Recognized .98 (.02) .01 (.02) 4.38 
Remember .33 (.15) .00 (.00) 1.89 
Know .64 (.15) .01 (.00) 2.68 
Feel .01 (.02) .00 (.00) 0.00 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Comparing lures against targets. 
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¼ 0.61). K ratings not only differed from F ratings; more important, they 
also differed from R ratings. 
Considering only K and F, the ANOVA yielded significant main ef-
fects of trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 49.11, MSE ¼ 0.28, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.53), item 
(F (1, 43) ¼ 1051.57, MSE ¼ 8.89, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.96), and recollective 
experience (F (1, 43) ¼ 597.72, MSE ¼ 5.27, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.93), as well 
as a significant trials � item interaction (F (3, 129) ¼ 83.60, MSE ¼ 0.46, 
p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.66). The interaction of trials by recollective experience 
was also significant: K items increased, while F items decreased some-
what from their already low initial levels (F (3, 129) ¼ 130.16, MSE ¼
1.05, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.75). The interaction of item status with recol-
lective experience was also significant: hits received more K ratings, 
while false alarms received mostly F ratings (F (1, 43) ¼ 652.42, MSE ¼
6.08, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.94). And the three-way interaction was also sig-
nificant: even for false alarms, F ratings disappeared entirely after the 
early study-test trials (F (3, 129) ¼ 89.08, MSE ¼ 0.64, p < .001, ηp2 ¼
0.67). 
A similar pattern occurred when comparing R and F items: main 
effect of trials, F (3, 129) ¼ 61.99, MSE ¼ 0.38, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.59; main 
effect of item, F (1, 43) ¼ 1077.79, MSE ¼ 11.25, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.96; 
main effect of recollective experience, F (1, 43) ¼ 393.56, MSE ¼ 6.78, p 
< .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.90; trials � item interaction, F (3, 129) ¼ 40.76, MSE ¼
0.23, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.49; trials x recollective experience, F (3, 129) ¼
7.61, MSE ¼ 0.06, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.15; item by recollective experience, F 
(1, 43) ¼ 505.62, MSE ¼ 8.05, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.15; three-way interac-
tion, F (3, 129) ¼ 11.95, MSE ¼ 0.10, p < .001, ηp2 ¼ 0.22. Both analyses, 
then, confirmed the findings of the previous experiments that K ratings, 
like R ratings, differ from F ratings. 
The signal-detection analysis yielded results similar to the prior 
studies. In view of the relative absence of false-positive recognition of 
lures, hit rates of 1.00 and false-alarm rates of 0.00 were adjusted 
following the prescription of Macmillan and Creelman (2005). Both R 
and K items were associated with higher values of d’ than F items. For F 
items, d’ was low even on Trial 1 and went to zero on Trial 15. Both R 
and K items showed substantial values of d’ throughout the experiment, 
but while d’ decreased for R items, it increased for K items – yet another 
difference between remembering and knowing. 
12.1. General discussion 
The experiments on recognition memory reported here support the 
epistemological and phenomenological distinction between “knowing” 
that an event occurred and “feeling” that it happened. As alternatives to 
conscious recognition-by-remembering, recognition-by-knowing and 
recognition-by-feeling differ in a number of important respects. First, 
they are differentiated by the effects of level of processing at the time of 
encoding. Reports of “Feeing” are more likely to occur following shallow 
phonemic semantic processing, while reports of “Knowing” are less 
affected by level of processing (Experiments 1–2). Recognition-by- 
feeling is increased when subjects are encouraged to adopt a liberal 
criterion for item recognition, but recognition-by-knowing is not 
(Experiment 2). Recognition-by feeling is associated with longer 
response latencies than recognition-by-knowing (Experiments 1–2), and 
increases when subjects are given a long time to think about their re-
sponses (Experiment 3); this is not true of recognition-by-knowing. False 
recognition of lures is often accompanied by “feeling”, but rarely 
accompanied by “knowing”, such that signal-detection measures of 
recognition accuracy are higher for knowing than for feeling (Experi-
ments 1–4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study 
trials, eventually supplanting recognition-by-remembering, while 
recognition-by-feeling drops essentially to zero (Experiment 4). In these 
ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by- 
feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional R/K paradigm, 
recognition-by-remembering is distinguished from recognition-without- 
remembering. 
In some respects, recognition-by-knowing resembles recognition-by- 
remembering. Neither is affected by loosening the criterion for recog-
nition, and both are associated with relatively short response latencies 
and a low level of false alarms. Still, there are some differences. Knowing 
is less affected than remembering by level of processing, and by the 
width of the response window. Most important, as already noted, 
knowing increased markedly with increased study-test trials, while 
remembering decreased. 
The foregoing experiments support a tripartite classification of rec-
ollective experience in recognition memory. Sometimes, recognition is 
accompanied by conscious recollection – not just of the event in ques-
tion, but also its spatial, temporal, and personal context – where and 
when it occurred, what else was going on, and what the person was 
thinking and doing at the time. On other occasions, however, some or all 
of these elements are lacking. Tulving, 1985 R/K paradigm was intended 
to capture this qualitative distinction between “remembering” an event 
and “knowing” that it occurred – Klein et al. (2002a) distinction between 
the “lived past” and the “known past”, and Levine et al.‘s (2004) 
distinction between episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. 
However, it appears that there is more than one alternative to remem-
bering an event. We can have abstract knowledge that an event 
occurred, in the absence of conscious recollection of its environmental 
and personal context, much as we know where we were born without 
actually remembering it. Or we can have an intuitive feeling that 
something is familiar, the way someone’s face or voice can “ring a bell” 
at a cocktail party, even though we cannot remember the person’s name 
or the circumstances under which we might have previously met him or 
her. 
Many psychological theories of memory focus on the processes un-
derlying task performance, while alternative, neuropsychological ap-
proaches focus on underling brain modules and systems. Tulving has 
expressed a clear preference for the systems approach (Schacter and 
Tulving, 1994;Tulving, 1985a, 1985b, 1999), as in his hypothesis that 
different memory systems mediate the different forms of recollective 
experience (autonoetic, noetic, and anoetic) that he identified. But there 
is also a third, complementary approach, which also has its roots in 
Tulving’s work (Tulving and Bower, 1974; Tulving and Watkins, 1975): 
an informational approach which focuses on the information accessible 
to subjects as they reconstruct some event from the past (Kihlstrom, 
1995, 1997). 
A full-fledged episodic memory may be thought of as a bundle of 
several different kinds of features: a representation of the event itself, 
presumably built by binding together links among items of conceptual 
knowledge already existing in semantic memory; a representation of the 
spatiotemporal context in which the event occurred, giving the memory 
a unique signature in space and time; and a representation of the person 
him- or herself, as the agent or patient, or stimulus or experiencer, of the 
event in question – including the individual’s emotional and motiva-
tional state in the moment. In principle, all of this information is 
available at the time the event is initially encoded in memory; but for a 
variety of reasons, some information may be inaccessible – or, at least, 
unaccessed – during later attempts at retrieval (Tulving and Pearlstone, 
1966). Which elements are accessed will shape the individual’s recol-
lective experience. 
Information about the personal context in which an event occurred 
seems necessary, if memory retrieval is to have the “autonoetic” quality 
described by Tulving, 1985a, 1985b. The subject will be able to 
remember that “This happened to me, this is what I was doing at the 
time, and this is how I felt about it”. On the other hand, if the infor-
mation relating to personal context fails to be encoded, or is subse-
quently lost or obscured by repetition, the memory will include only 
information about the situational context in which the event occurred – 
a sort of “list tag” (Anderson et al., 1998; Reder et al., 2000). The result 
will be a memory that, while formally episodic in nature, because it 
refers to an event which occurred at a specific time and place, will also 
possess the abstract, impersonal character that is characteristic of a se-
mantic memory: “This word was on that list”. If both types of links are 
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lost, all that is left are activated representations of the event itself: the 
“free radicals” (Tulving, 1983, p. 114) that provide the basis for priming, 
the feeling of familiarity, and similar effects: “This word rings a bell, so it 
might have been on the list”. Of course, the subject’s judgment might be 
wrong, leading to a relatively high incidence of false alarms. 
Knowing and feeling are both conscious “noetic” states, in Tulving, 
1985 terms, as opposed to the “autonoetic” state of remembering (and 
the “anoetic” state associated with the retrieval of unconscious proce-
dural knowledge), but they differ in some respects that may have neu-
ropsychological implications. For example, it appears that the 
hippocampus, which is critical for relational processing (Eichenbaum, 
2002; Moscovitch et al., 2016) is also critical for remembering (recol-
lection) but not feeling (familiarity); and the parahippocampal and 
perirhinal cortex surrounding the hippocampus plays a role in the 
feeling of familiarity but not remembering (e.g., Diana et al., 2007; Kim, 
2010; Montaldi and Mayes, 2010; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003; Rugg and 
Vilberg, 2013; Schapiro et al., 2017; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Similarly, 
the ventral region of the posterior parietal cortex appears to be associ-
ated with recollection, while the dorsal region with familiarity (Frithsen 
and Miller, 2014). 
In a recent comprehensive survey of this literature, Bastin et al. 
(2019) have distinguished between two core representational systems 
serving episodic memory: a relational system underlying recollection, 
consisting of the hippocampus, mammillary bodies, and the anterior 
nuclei of the thalamus; and an entity system underlying familiarity, 
consisting of occipito-temporal cortex, occipital-parietal cortex, anterior 
temporal cortex, perirhinal cortex and anterolateral entorhinal cortex, 
parahippocampal cortex and posteromedial entorhinal cortex, each 
element processing a different aspect of an event. There is also a 
self-referential system, associated with the orbital and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. These interact with a “downstream” attribution sys-
tem which collects information about fluency and detail to determine 
both retrieval success and the accompanying subjective experience of 
recollection or familiarity. 
Knowing, as defined here, is similar to retrieval from semantic 
memory, and so may activate widely distributed portions of cerebral 
cortex (Kim, 2016; Yee et al., 2014). Still, knowing requires access to at 
least some pieces of relational information (e.g., links to spatiotemporal 
context, represented in verbal-learning experiments by a list marker), if 
not others (e.g., links to the self as agent, patient, stimulus, or experi-
encer of the event in question), so the hippocampus may play a more 
prominent role in knowing than it does in feeling (or nonautobio-
graphical aspects of semantic memory). Neuroimaging studies also 
suggest that the retrieval of episodic autobiographical memory (episodic 
AM), similar to what is meant here by “remembering”, is mediated by 
the medial temporal cortex and prefrontal cortex, as indicated by the 
comparisons of recollection and familiarity described above; on the 
other hand, retrieval of semantic autobiographical memory (semantic 
AM), close to what is meant here by “knowing”, is served by the 
ventrolateral temporal cortex and other extrahippocampal structures 
(Levine et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2008; Winocur and Moscovitch, 
2011). In a study employing diffusion MRI, Hodgetts et al. (2017) 
expanded the episodic AM system to include the fornix and the semantic 
AM system to include the inferior longitudinal fasciculus. In their view, 
the involvement of these long-range input/output pathways underscores 
the importance of an extended network of cortical and subcortical 
structures supporting both forms of autobiographical memory. 
Dual-process theories have a long and distinguished history in the 
psychology of memory (Anderson and Bower, 1972; Atkinson and Juola, 
1974; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Watkins and Gardiner, 1979; 
Yonelinas, 2002). Although intuitively appealing and formally elegant, 
they may not fully capture the actual experience of remembering one’s 
past. This experience may be one of conscious recollection, but it may 
also entail knowing about events of the personal past that one does not 
personally remember; and it may include intuitions about one’s past 
similar to the “feeling of knowing”, as well as beliefs about the past 
derived from other sources of information. If so, future computational 
models, and neuropsychological investigations, of episodic memory may 
need to consider the possibility that there are more than just two vari-
eties of recollective experience. 
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